






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© Institute for Safe Med













#### Institute of Medicine Report: To Err Is Human, 1999


Hospital medical errors kill 44,000-98,000 people per year:

"These stunningly high rates of medical errors - resulting in deaths, permanent disability, and unnecessary suffering - are simply unacceptable in a system that promises to first 'do no harm'."

William Richardson



izmp





#### **Canadian Adverse Events Study**


- $\sim\!\!7.5\%$  of hospital admissions involved an adverse event
- **37% of adverse events were preventable** Extrapolation:
- Of  $\sim 2.5$  million hospital admissions in Canada in 2000
- 70,000 incidents of harm were determined to be preventable
- between 9,000 and 24,000 deaths due to adverse events could have been prevented


Baker GR, Norton P et al. CMAJ, May 25, 2004.

#### **Observations**

- Issues are similar across the spectrum of care and from country to country
- We know why errors/incidents are happening
- We know a lot about what to do to improve systems
- We are starting to change -
  - It is difficult
  - It is worth it!

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





## **The Person Approach**


Remedial measures are directed primarily at the 'sharp end' error maker: naming, blaming, shaming, retraining, fear appeals, writing another procedure, etc.


J. Reason, Halifax 10 Symposium, October 2010













































**Dangerous Abbreviations** 60 Regular INSULIN NOW • Resulted in a 10-fold dosing error and patient harm irmp




## Human Factor Examples

• Memory

in

- Inattentional Blindness
- Confirmation Bias






# Memory Inherent Human Limitations • Limited memory span: 7 +/- 2 pieces of information can be held when attention is full • Factors affecting memory

Stress

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• Fatigue and other physiological factors

Miller GA (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing information. *Psychological Review*, 63(2): 81-97. Retrieved from <u>http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Miller/</u>





Interruption	Time	Description of interruption	Location	Туре	Nursing process	Cognitive stacking measure: # activities
1	0734	Unit Clerk inquiry	Nurses desk	Delay	N/A	5
2	0808	Paged	Patient room	Disrupt direct	Intervention	10
3	0852	RN inquiry	Nurses desk	Disrupt indirect	Intervention	18
4	0853	Patient inquiry	Nurses desk	Disrupt indirect	Intervention	19
5	0935	MD rounds	Patient room	Disrupt direct	Intervention	18
6	0941	Paged	Patient room	Disrupt Indirect	Intervention	18
7	0957	Answers phone	Patient room	Delay	N/A	17
8	1010	Responds to patient call out	Hallway	Delay	N/A	17
9	1014	Computer malfunction	Patient room	Delay	N/A	17
10	1021	Unit Clerk report	Nurses desk	Disrupt direct	Planning	17
11	1104	MD inquiry	Nurses desk	Disrupt direct	Planning	19
12	1105	Unit Clerk inquiry	Nurses desk	Delay	N/A	18
13	1239	Computer malfunction	Patient room	Delay	N/A	14
14	1248	Paged	Patient room	Delay	N/A	14
15	1359	Patient inquiry	Hallway	Delay	N/A	15
16	1451	Unit Clerk report	Nurses station	Delay	N/A	11




## Memory – Safety Strategies


- Minimize reliance on memory create process cues
- Be conscious of how many tasks you are trying to do at once
- Limit interruptions


## **Inattentional Blindness**

- Failing to see what should have been plainly visible
  - Because attention is not focused on it
- Most of our perceptual processing occurs outside of conscious awareness
- Attentional resources are finite
- Amount of attention required is affected by practice and task difficulty

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## Workarounds or at-risk behaviour

- Natural tendency to take shortcuts to make completion of tasks easier or increase efficiency
- Workarounds occur when a procedure or action does not "fit" with the workflow

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
#### Examples of At-Risk Behaviours in the Medication Use Process

- Preparing medications for more than one person at a time or "prepouring"
- Not taking the MAR to the bedside for sign-off when administering meds
- Borrowing medications from another patient's supply

ISMP Medication Safety Alert! October 7, 2004



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## Human Factors Engineering (HFE) 101

**HFE:** a discipline concerned with design of systems, tools, processes, machines that takes into account human capabilities, limitations, and characteristics



HFE concepts guide RCA and FMEA.

## Reality of Health Care Environments

- Cognitive overload
- Workloads
- Multitasking
- Interruptions
- Difficult technology
- Look-alike packaging and labelling
- Sound-alike medication names

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



- Make architectural or other physical changes
- · Perform usability testing
- Reduce reliance on memory or vigilance
- · Eliminate / reduce distractions
- Build in redundancy
- · Use warnings and labels

ivmp


#### **The Systems Approach**

- Preventable adverse events are caused by interaction between:
  - flaws in the working environment (system)
  - unavoidably imperfect humans
- Adverse events can be reduced by building a system that:
  - reduces error
  - prevents error from causing harm



















## The Three Checks

Check the label:

- 1. When the medication is selected;
- 2. When the medication is poured;
- 3. When the medication is returned.





#### But....

What about confirmation bias, distractions, interruptions, complexity of equipment, packaging, stress, noise, lighting, nature of work etc.?

It's not about competence!

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
# Story

An elderly woman was receiving palliative care. To help manage her pain, she was ordered:

Morphine 1 to 2 mg subcutaneously q3-4h prn

- Morphine 10 mg was administered instead of morphine 1 mg (a ten-fold error).
- When the error was identified, the attending physician and the patient's family were notified. Treatment options were discussed. The family asked that she not be given Naloxone (Narcan). She subsequently died.







### So where should we start?

• Medication administration accounts for up to one-third of nurses' time

Most of the time = hunting and gathering

 Nurses are human – they will <u>never</u> be error-free...even when they are very careful

Bates, et al. 1995; Keohane, et al. 2008; Leape, et al., 1995; Pepper 1995.

#### So where should we start?

- 38% of errors originate in the administration phase of the medication use process
- And, 51% of those errors cause harm
- Only 2% of errors occurring at this stage are intercepted

## So where should we start?

• High-alert drugs

**i**/mp

- Vulnerable, high-risk populations
- Error-prone processes

## **High alert medications**


#### Definition


High-alert medications are drugs that bear a heightened risk of causing significant patient harm when they are used in error.


#### i/mp

# Examples of high alert medications

- Concentrated electrolytes
- Opioids
- Insulin
- Anticoagulants
- Chemotherapy agents
- Neuromuscular blockers
- Vasopressors







#### What can you do?


- Report incidents when they occur and participate in follow-up reviews
- Look for and report potential hazards in your practice setting
- Support shared learning from errors

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• Support your colleagues when errors occur








## What Can NURSES Do?

Embrace/listen/involve/collaborate with:

- patients
- clients
- residents
- families
- significant others etc...into the medication use process
- AND other healthcare professionals





# Climate of Safety

- Embrace systems approach
- Staff encouraged to report hazards, incidents and adverse events
- Response to incidents:
  - Focus on system >>persons involved

## Learning and Sharing

- Cultivate a culture of safety
- Report errors/ near misses/ hazardous conditions


#### **Reciprocal Trust:**

The system must trust that you will call out

<u>AND</u>

You must trust that the system is safe to call out to, will listen and respond

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#### Practitioners vs. System Failure

"People working in health care are among the most educated and dedicated workforce in any industry. The problem is not bad people; the problem is that the system needs to be made safer."

To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, IOM Report 1999

inub

"We don't believe that people come to work to do a bad job or make an error, but given the right set of circumstances any of us can make a mistake. We must force ourselves to look past the easy answer that it was someone's fault – to answer the tougher question as to why the error occurred. It is seldom a single reason."

(Veterans Affairs, 2005)

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## **ISMP Canada Contacts**

- Webinars: webinars@ismp-canada.org
- Workshops: <a href="mailto:education@ismp-canada.org">education@ismp-canada.org</a>
- Consultations: consults@ismp-canada.org
- CMIRPS: <u>www.ismp-canada.org/cmirps.htm</u>
- Medication Safety Self-Assessments: <u>mssa@ismp-canada.org</u>
- OR Checklist: <u>OperatingRoomChecklist@ismp-canada.org</u>
- Questions: <u>info@ismp-canada.org</u>